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JURISDICTION'
This is an appeal from the Final Order denying Defendant's
Korir-i r--

^rre'^ Sentence rendered against Appellant, in the

T
before the Honourable r.enneih Rigtiup.

The uT.-J:I Cuui : o; Appeals

has jurisdiction i n thi s matter pursuant to Title 78, Section 2a3

1 Jtal I Code Ai n :i , ] 9 53

as ai nei ided.

1

STATEMENT

OF

THE

ISSUES

PRESENTED

FOR

REVIEW

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it sentenced
Louis Clark to consecutive sentences because Clark raised his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and refused to
cooperate with law enforcement authorities?
STANDARD

OF

APPELLATE

REVIEW

In the standard of review for "plain error" there are two
requirements to determine whether plain error has occurred.

The

first requirement is that it should have been obvious to a trial
court that it was committing error.

...The second and somewhat

interrelated requirement is that the error affect the substantial
rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful.

The

standard of review for addressing the illegal sentencing issue for
the first time under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e),
provides that the court may correct an illegal sentence, or a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.

However, this

rule has been interpreted as granting continuing jurisdiction to
the trial court to correct an illegally imposed sentence.
v. Galleaos, 849 P.2d 586, 591-92 (Utah App. 1993)

State

Therefore, the

trial court is the proper forum to first challenge the imposition
of allegedly illegal sentences.
Rep. 33, 37 (1994).

State v. Brooks, 230 Utah Adv.

The standard for whether the assertion of

fifth amendment right is proper is based upon the recognition,
federal statutes conferring immunity on witnesses in federal
judicial proceedings, including grand jury investigations, are so

2

familiar that they have become part of our "constitutional
fabi' 11

ri

Supi d , ,-ii 4 '-"

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES. AND RULES
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a capital . cr
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without just compensation.''

U.S. CONST, amend. V,

appear and defenc :u person and by counsel, •: =; aema^u the n a i u U
and cause of the accusation against him. r\- have a copy thereof,
to testify :i i i 1 :i :i s o w i 1 bel la ] f

tc 1: e ::: :>i ifr :>i: ite :I hy tl i = i r:i tnesses

against him, to have compulsory pi: ocess to compel the attendance
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy pub] i c trial by
ai l :i i i: tpar t:::i e ] ji i:i : y o f tl: I = cc: i n i t ^ c :i : d :l St.] : :i ::t: :i i I \ j 1: :i :i cl I tl i B offense
is alleged to have been committed, and the r i ght to appeal in all
cases,

In no instance shall any accused, person, before final

judgmei it, be coi i: ipe.,1 ] ed to ad vai ice n toi ie;;y oi : £e es to si
rights herein guaranteed.

The accused shall not be compelled to

give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
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testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense,
Utah Const.. Art. I, § 12.
"The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." U.R.Cr.P. 22(e).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS RELEVANT
TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This is an appeal from Appellant's Motion to Correct Sentence
which was filed on October 12, 1994. An Order denying the Motion
to Correct Sentence was signed by Judge Rigtrup on December 16,
1994, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
Utah.
Appellant, Louis Malcolm Clark ("Clark"), was originally
charged with three counts of falsely signing a financial
transaction card/sales slip, all second degree felonies.

After a

two-day jury trial, held on November 17 and 18, 1992, one count
was dismissed upon the State's motion, but Clark was convicted on
the remaining two counts.

Three separate sentencing hearings were

conducted on the matter, and constitutes the evidence for purposes
of both the Motion to Correct the Sentence and the instant Appeal.
At the first sentencing hearing held on January 4, 1993, the Trial
Court stated that Clark had failed to disclose information related
to his background and family, and failed to cooperate with the
Adult Probation and Parole Department ("AP&P") concerning his
presentence report.

Post-Trial Motions, Transcript of Proceedings

("Hra. 1"), at 245.

The State recommended that Clark go to prison

and serve consecutive sentences because the State claimed that it
4

could not determine whether any prior crimes had been committed by
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At the Third Sentencing Hearing, the Trial Court again began
by claiming that Clark had provided AP&P with little information
to prepare a report.

The Court then shifted its focus, however,

and stated that it was inclined to run the sentences consecutively
unless Clark cooperated with law enforcement and gave them a full
disclosure concerning other crimes in which Clark may have been
involved, and identified co-conspirators.

(Emphasis added.) Post-

Trial Motions, Transcript of Proceedings, ("Hra. 3"), at 265.
Counsel for Clark pointed out that at the conclusion of the trial,
the Court had suggested that it would accept the recommendation in
the Presentence Report prepared for Judge Hanson's case, and would
likely impose a sentence to run concurrently with the sentence
imposed by Judge Hanson.

Hra. 3 at 266.

Counsel also pointed out that at the second hearing, there
had been a turn of events, in which the Trial Court wanted Clark
to cooperate law enforcement officials rather than be interviewed
by AP&P for additional background information. j£. at 267.
Counsel for Appellant acknowledged that the Trial Court had
an interest in certain background information, but forcing Clark
to become involved in this investigation, through possibly selfincriminating statements to federal investigators, was a violation
of his constitutional rights. J£. at 272. The Court stated that
it recognized Clark had a right to remain silent, and that he not
incriminate himself without a grant of immunity from law
enforcement agencies. The Court also acknowledged that no such
immunity had been offered to Clark; and that the Court could not
6

legitimately force Clark to do anything.

However, the Court then

stated, "it is clear that he didn't give any useful information to
AP & P.

When he appeared before me, the prosecutor made the

request that he cooperate with the law enforcement officers.
That's the point in which the Court made it clear that

seemed to

be appropriate." XfiL- at 273.
Thereafter, the Trial Court imposed a consecutive sentence
because, as the Court stated, "there is no indication in Judge
Hanson's report, as well as mine, that there was any cooperation
with law enforcement officers to explain these as well as other
crimes."

Id. at 277.

(Emphasis added).

The Trial Court stated

that given the lack of cooperation, the Court was justified in
sentencing Clark to 1 to 15 year sentences on both counts. The
Trial Court ran the sentences consecutive to each other, plus
consecutive to the sentence imposed by Judge Hanson in another
case.

l£l. at 278.
SUMMARY

OF THE ARGUMENT

The Trial Court violated Clark's constitutional rights when
it imposed consecutive, rather than concurrent sentences, based
upon the fact that Clark would not divulge information to federal
law enforcement officials relating to the crimes with which he was
charged, or other similar crimes that occurred in Utah. Due
process applies in post-trial, as well as, trial proceedings.
Clark raised his Fifth Amendment privilege against self
incrimination during the sentencing phase of his trial once it was
revealed that the Trial Court no longer wanted Clark to provide
7

testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Utah Const.. Art. I, § 12.
"The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." U.R.Cr.P. 22(e).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS RELEVANT
TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This is an appeal from Appellant's Motion to Correct Sentence
which was filed on October 12, 1994. An Order denying the Motion
to Correct Sentence was signed by Judge Rigtrup on December 16,
1994, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
Utah.
Appellant, Louis Malcolm Clark ("Clark"), was originally
charged with three counts of falsely signing a financial
transaction card/sales slip, all second degree felonies. After a
two-day jury trial, held on November 17 and 18, 1992, one count
was dismissed upon the State's motion, but Clark was convicted on
the remaining two counts. Three separate sentencing hearings were
conducted on the matter, and constitutes the evidence for purposes
of both the Motion to Correct the Sentence and the instant Appeal.
At the first sentencing hearing held on January 4, 1993, the Trial
Court stated that Clark had failed to disclose information related
to his background and family, and failed to cooperate with the
Adult Probation and Parole Department ("AP&P") concerning his
presentence report.

Post-Trial Motions, Transcript of Proceedings

("Hra. 1"), at 245. The State recommended that Clark go to prison
and serve consecutive sentences because the State claimed that it
4

could not determine whether any prior crimes had been committed by
Appellant. Hra. 1 at 243.

At the conclusion of the First

Sentencing Hearing, the Trial Court directed Clark to provide a
description of the crime and some collateral contacts to the AP&P.
Id. at 253, 254.

Thereafter, a second hearing was set for

February 22, 1993.
No one from AP&P interviewed, or even attempted to contact
the Appellant, as had been discussed during the First Sentencing
Hearing.

At the Second Sentencing Hearing, a Salt Lake County

Assistant District Attorney stated that, for law enforcement
purposes, the State desired that detectives involved in the case,
and other similar cases, interview Clark rather than AP&P.

Post-

Trial Motions, Transcript of Proceedings, ("Hra. 2"), at 260.
Counsel for Clark began to state that it was his inclination that
only AP&P needed more information relating to Defendant's
background when he was interrupted by the Trial Court.
The Court stated "...I think the information would be helpful
to law enforcement and important enough that I could consider the
less severe sentence.
Report deficiencies."

It is not really the Presentence
J&.

(Emphasis added).

The Assistant

District Attorney was told to send law enforcement officers to the
prison to see Appellant; and then report to the Court whether he
had cooperated.

If it was reported that Clark did not cooperate,

the Trial Court indicated that it would impose consecutive
sentences.

I&- at 263.

A third sentencing hearing was set for

March 22, 1993.
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At the Third Sentencing Hearing, the Trial Court again began
by claiming that Clark had provided AP&P with little information
to prepare a report.

The Court then shifted its focus, however,

and stated that it was inclined to run the sentences consecutively
unless Clark cooperated with law enforcement and gave them a full
disclosure concerning other crimes in which Clark may have been
involved, and identified co-conspirators.

(Emphasis added.) Post-

Trial Motions, Transcript of Proceedings, ("Hra. 3"). at 265.
Counsel for Clark pointed out that at the conclusion of the trial,
the Court had suggested that it would accept the recommendation in
the Presentence Report prepared for Judge Hanson's case, and would
likely impose a sentence to run concurrently with the sentence
imposed by Judge Hanson.

Hra. 3 at 266.

Counsel also pointed out that at the second hearing, there
had been a turn of events, in which the Trial Court wanted Clark
to cooperate law enforcement officials rather than be interviewed
by AP&P for additional background information, j£l. at 267.
Counsel for Appellant acknowledged that the Trial Court had
an interest in certain background information, but forcing Clark
to become involved in this investigation, through possibly selfincriminating statements to federal investigators, was a violation
of his constitutional rights. X&. at 272. The Court stated that
it recognized Clark had a right to remain silent, and that he not
incriminate himself without a grant of immunity from law
enforcement agencies. The Court also acknowledged that no such
immunity had been offered to Clark; and that the Court could not
6

legitimately force Clark to do anything.

However, the Court then

stated, "it is clear that he didn't give any useful information to
AP Sc P.

When he appeared before me, the prosecutor made the

request that he cooperate with the law enforcement officers.
That's the point in which the Court made it clear that
be appropriate."

seemed to

XdU at 273.

Thereafter, the Trial Court imposed a consecutive sentence
because, as the Court stated, "there is no indication in Judge
Hanson's report, as well as mine, that there was any cooperation
with law enforcement officers to explain these as well as other
crimes."

Id. at 277.

(Emphasis added).

The Trial Court stated

that given the lack of cooperation, the Court was justified in
sentencing Clark to 1 to 15 year sentences on both counts. The
Trial Court ran the sentences consecutive to each other, plus
consecutive to the sentence imposed by Judge Hanson in another
case.

Id. at 278.
SUMMARY

OF THE ARGUMENT

The Trial Court violated Clark's constitutional rights when
it imposed consecutive, rather than concurrent sentences, based
upon the fact that Clark would not divulge information to federal
law enforcement officials relating to the crimes with which he was
charged, or other similar crimes that occurred in Utah. Due
process applies in post-trial, as well as, trial proceedings.
Clark raised his Fifth Amendment privilege against self
incrimination during the sentencing phase of his trial once it was
revealed that the Trial Court no longer wanted Clark to provide
7

I

background information to Adult Parole and Probation, but instead,
desired Clark to cooperate with federal investigating authorities
from the United States Postal Services and the United States
Secret Service.
Clark's refusal to cooperate was not an attempt to protect
any "former partners" in crime, thereby "preserving his ability to
resume criminal activities upon release", but was to protect his
right against self incrimination as it related to any future
federal charges against him.

The Trial Court abused its

discretion when it considered Clark's refusal to cooperate with
federal agents as a deciding factor in determining whether to
impose consecutive sentences.

The sentence imposed by the Trial

Court violated Clark's Fifth Amendment rights under the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution
for the State of Utah, thereby making it an unconstitutional and
illegal sentence.

Consequently, the Trial Court should have

granted Clark's Motion to Correct Sentence, which was timely
filed, because the trial court "may correct an illegal sentence,
or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah
Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e).

8

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER APPELLANT'S CLAIM ON APPEAL
BECAUSE RULE 22(e) EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT AN ILLEGAL
SENTENCE MAY BE CORRECTED AT ANY TIME.

A,

The Express Language Qf Rule 22(e) Permits Appellant
to Raise Hip Igpue on Appeal t
Appellant has the right to appeal the District Court's Final

Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Correct Sentence.

In fact,

Rule 22(e) specifically states that "The court may correct an
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at
any time." Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Since the District

Court placed an unconstitutional demand upon Appellant as a
condition to receiving a less harsh sentence, Clark was permitted
(and probably required) to seek to have his sentence corrected by
the trial court.

There is no time limit provided in this rule.

Likewise, there is no applicable procedural bar or any statute of
limitation which has not been met by the Appellant.

Indeed, the

State has provided absolutely no authority for its position that
the procedure followed by Appellant, in his attempt to correct the
illegal sentence, is improper.

Thus, since the illegal and

unconstitutional sentence was handed down to Appellant; and his
Motion to Correct the Sentence has been

denied, this appeal fits

squarely within both the time frame and the procedure for an
Appeal from a Final Order of the district court refusing to
correct that illegal sentence.
Appellant has therefore brought this appeal to the proper
forum.

In fact, when this very court had occasion to address a

9

similar issue, the Utah Court of Appeals explained that "...the
trial court is the proper forum to first challenge the imposition
of allegedly illegal sentences." State v. Brooks, 230 Utah Adv.
Rep. 33, 37 (1994).

Similarly, this Court has recognized that the

trial court maintains continuing jurisdiction in order to correct
an illegally imposed sentence.

State v. Galleaos. 84 P.2d 586,

591 (Utah App. 1993).
The instant appeal is not a situation involving principles of

res judicata,

collateral

estoppel,

or even stare

decisis.

The

issue raised in the instant appeal has never been presented,
argued and ruled upon by the Court of Appeals; and this appeal is
not merely an attempt to reinstate the direct appeal which that
was abandoned.

The State's characterization is therefore unfair

when it compares

this situation with one wherein an appellant

voluntarily or deliberately abandoned his direct appeal; and then,
later regretted his decision, so another appeal was filed in place
of the old one.
Furthermore, Appellant has been completely candid with this
court about the nature of this appeal. The Docketing Statement
filed with this court clearly stated that there was a prior
related appeal but that "it was eventually dismissed for lack of
prosecution because prior counsel for Appellant failed to file
Appellant's Brief."

The related appeal was also identified in the

Docketing Statement by the date on which it was filed, case
number, and even the reason for its dismissal.

10

Ironically, the State filed a Motion to Strike Appellant's
Opening Brief asserting the very same arguments more than six (6)
months ago; and this Court denied that Motion.

While suggesting

that Appellant is raising the very same argument after it has
already been properly disposed of, the State is rearguing its
claim that the prior related Appeal bars Appellant appealing the
Third District Court's Final Order on is Motion to Correct
Sentence.

That same request was denied by this Court less than

six months ago.
Appellant is able to reference specific case and statutory
authority in support of Appellant's position in the instant
appeal, while the State is engaged in an effort to mischaracterize
the nature of this appeal; yet it cites absolutely no support or
precedent for its position.

The trial court was indeed the

appropriate forum for Appellant to first challenge an illegally
imposed sentence.

State v. Brooks. 230 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37.

The

express language of Rule 22(e) provides that Appellant's Motion
was timely; Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 22(e); and this
rule has been interpreted as granting continuing jurisdiction to
the trial court for purposes of correcting an illegal sentence.
State v. Galleaos, 849 P.2d at 592.

Clearly, this Court should

address the merits of Appellant's appeal, as the State has offered
absolutely no logical reason to do otherwise.

11

B.

The Cases Cited bv The State Either Do Not A D P I V Or
Are Easily Distinguishable.
The cases cited by the State completely ignore the fact that

appellant has raised a valid issue on appeal. The instant appeal
is obviously derived from the Final Order Denying Defendant's
Motion to Correct Sentencing.

All of the State's cases presuppose

that appellant is trying to either resuscitate an appeal that was
already dismissed; or to re-litigate an issue which has previously
been addressed and ruled upon by this Court. Obviously, the
issues are similar, because they are all generated from the same
illegal sentencing procedure followed by the trial court.
However, the fact that the legal issues are similar and the facts
are interrelated, in no way means that Appellant is barred from
his present appeal.
The State's argument asserts that because the direct appeal
was dismissed, no other appeals can ever be taken by Appellant,
even if it is based upon separate causes of action.

There can

certainly be no question that the instant appeal was taken from a
Final Order; and the State has provided no case law or statutory
authority which demonstrates that the instant appeal should be
barred as improper.
The State would also have this Court believe that because
Appellant did not repeatedly state that this appeal is an appeal
of the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Correct Sentence and
then limit his citations to the record of the Hearing on that
Motion; that it is somehow a different and deceitful "end run

12

around (the law)."

The Conclusions of Law in the District Court's

Final Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Correct Sentence states
little more than that the court stands by its earlier sentencing,
based upon that Court's same prior reasoning (refusal to cooperate
with law enforcement).

All of these issues are addressed by

Appellant in his brief; and it is misleading for the State to
suggest that Appellant's efforts to correct the sentence is in
some way less than candid.
This court should consider Appellant's claims on appeal
because they were properly raised and addressed in the Brief and
squarely within appropriated appellate procedure.

In fact, this

Court's holdings in cases such as Galleaos and Brooks, supra,
suggest that this Court prefers the filing of a Motion to Correct
Illegal Sentence with the district court prior to an attempt to
raise the same issue first by a direct appeal.

This is similar to

the preferred procedure for addressing an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim.
Contrary to the State's argument, Appellant is not taking
some roundabout approach to arriving at the same end.

In fact, it

is quite the opposite, because this appeal is the most direct way
to correct an illegal sentence.

By contrast, completely ignoring

the language of Brooks, the State proposes that Appellant be
required to file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in order to
address his rights pursuant to Rule 22(e).

Through this

procedure, the State would have Appellant present his argument to
someone other than the Sentencing Court, have a different judge
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review the prior comments at sentencing, determine whether such
comments and opinions were appropriate, and then decide whether to
grant Extraordinary Relief based upon this process.

An appeal

would then follow this lengthy and resource consuming process.
The approach suggested by Brooks. that "the trial court is
the proper forum to first challenge the imposition of allegedly
illegal sentences..." pursuant to Rule 22(e) is clearly superior
to the alternative advocated by the State.

Appellant has

appropriately raised the sentencing issue before this Court in
accordance with applicable procedure.

This Court should therefore

address the merits and substance of this issues raised by
Appellant in the instant appeal.
11 . THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
SENTENCED CLARK TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES BASED UPON
CLARK'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH THE INVESTIGATING
LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES.
A.

The State 's Claim That The Sentencing Court Was Only
Concerned With Obtaining "Background Information" Is
Completely Inconsistent With The Record.
Appellant's refusal to give information to investigating

authorities was not done in any effort to be uncooperative, or to
protect some illegitimate criminal cohorts.

Instead Appellant's

silence was based entirely upon his constitutional rights against
compelled testimony against himself.

Appellant's rights are the

same whether he "takes the Fifth," pursuant to Article I Section
12 of the Utah Constitution, or the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

The State either misperceives or

misrepresents the true facts of this case; and the impression the
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State gives regarding Appellant's willingness to provide so-called
"background information" is extremely misleading.

At the

conclusion of Appellant's trial, but prior to Sentencing, Judge
Kenneth Rigtrup directed the Adult Probation and Parole Department
".•.that they are to send [Judge Rigtrup] a copy of the
Presentence Report going to Judge Hanson; and update it if they
have any additional information to give." (Transcript at 234).
This was done both to expedite Appellant's sentencing process and
because Judge Rigtrup had scheduled some time off.

i£i. , at 233.

When Adult Probation and Parole interviewed Appellant for his
sentencing scheduled before Judge Timothy Hanson, it had already
been discussed, and Judge Hanson had fully anticipated that
Appellant would not make any significant disclosures to Adult
Probation and Parole in light of his up-coming trial before Judge
Rigtrup.
The so-called lack of "background information" was therefore
not treated as any significant problem by Judge Hanson when
Appellant was sentenced.

Likewise, upon a careful review of the

record, it is obvious that Judge Rigtrup was also not seriously
concerned about any additional "background information" necessary
to accomplish an appropriate sentence of the Appellant.
Specifically, when the parties convened for the Second, as well
as, the Third Sentencing Hearings conducted on February 22 and
March 22, 1993 respectively, Judge Rigtrup made himself very clear
in that he would impose consecutive sentences "unless Appellant
cooperated

with

law enforcement." III. , at 260.
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At the Second Sentencing Hearing, the following exchange took
place:
Mr. Ybarra: I would think that, for law
enforcement purposes, we'd want the detective to
interview the Defendant.
Is that what the Defendant is proposing that
we'd be able to do? I can pass that on to them, Miss
Byrne?
Mr. Booker: Our inclination was to have Adult
Probation and Parole -Mr. Ybarra: I don't think -Mr.Booker: -- here -Mr. Ybarra: That would be terribly useful to
the State; although....
Mr. Booker: Well, your Honor suggested that he
needed more information on the Defendant's background
and just finding out who -The Court: Just cooperate. The only thing you
get points for is cooperation, really, with law
enforcement. You are giving me the Andrew Valdez
speech. I heard it at great length, that somehow one
should not cooperate with law enforcement, and I don't
buy that..." 1^.
The Court concluded its address to Mr. Clark by stating:
"So you can decide whether you want to be out there
consecutive or concurrently. I think the information
would be very helpful to law enforcement and
important enough that I could consider the less severe
sentence.
It is not really the Presentence Report
deficiencies." III., at 261.
One can certainly not read the above exchange and
legitimately conclude that Judge Rigtrup was somehow genuinely
concerned about some general "background information" or other
deficiencies in the Presentence Report submitted to Judge Hanson,
when he candidly stated, on the record, and in open Court, that he
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was not concerned with any "background information" or
"deficiencies" in the Presentence Report. The State's claims to
the contrary are therefore entirely inconsistent with the
objective evidence before this Court.
B.

Appellant's Objection To Being Compelled To Give
Testimony And Assist Federal Investigators Was Clearly
And Specifically Raised.
At the Final Sentencing Hearing Appellant's counsel clearly

informed Judge Rigtrup that an Inspector from the Unites States
Postal Service, Gene Griffin, and an agent from United States
Secret Services, Roger Rodak were among the persons whom the
County Attorneys Office desired to have interview Mr. Clark.

Id..

at pp. 267-269. These federal investigators were clearly not
persons whose interest was in providing "background information"
to the trial court.
There were numerous, specific references by Appellant's
counsel that Mr. Clark's fears were related to "subsequent
prosecution and possible conviction in Federal Court." id. , at
268.

Furthermore, his Counsel specifically raised Appellant's

rights against self-incrimination as they related to "any future
federal charges under the Utah Constitution and the Federal
Constitution." Id., at 268-269.
The plain and simple truth is that no one from Adult
Probation and Parole ever even attempted to obtain any additional
information from Appellant.

In fact, absolutely no legitimate

effort was made to over come the so-called "deficiencies;" and an
objective review of the facts reveal that neither the State nor
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the District Court were interested in any "background
information."

In deed, Adult Probation and Parole never even

attempted to contact Appellant or his counsel. The record in this
matter plainly contradicts the State's present claim that the
Court and the State were merely seeking background information
through purely innocent means. One cannot argue in good faith
that requiring a defendant to be interviewed by a federal Postal
Inspector and Secret Service Agent, without a grant of immunity,
about criminal activity, does not expose that defendant to
subsequent prosecution in federal court. Under the circumstances,
one also cannot legitimately claim that these federal agents were
innocently engaged in an effort to assist Judge Rigtrup in
overcoming deficiencies in the Presentence Report.
The State repeatedly refers to Appellant as uncooperative merely
because he asserted his privilege against self-incrimination.

The

State argues that the Appellant has some social obligation to
divulge this information as a means of helping out law
enforcement; and in its Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant's
Motion to Correct Sentence, the State even referred to these
rights as, the recitation of a "magical incantation." The State
fails to recognize however that there is HQ compelling social
obligation when the Appellant's silence is protected by the
privilege against self-incrimination, as it was in the instant
case.

Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558, 100 S. Ct.

1358, 1363 (1980).
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Therefore, it is not Appellant's background, history, and
rehabilitative needs that the sentencing court took into account
when it gave the most harsh sentence available to the Appellant.
Instead, the court observed the Appellant's failure to incriminate
himself during a continuing federal investigation by the United
States Postal Service and Secret Service, then decided that his
reliance upon the privilege against self-incrimination was
unacceptable.

This caused the court to rely upon groundless

inferences when it sentenced Appellant to two additional,
consecutive terms of imprisonment.

There is not question that the

above sentencing procedure was unfair, unconstitutional and
illegal.
Therefore, because no officer of the District Court was ever
sent to interview Appellant (after it was made clear to him the
importance of cooperating with AP&P), Appellant was never given
any opportunity to cooperate with the proper authorities in a
meaningful way.

Tr., at 257.

Instead, only federal

investigators, with an eye towards prosecution in federal court,
were sent to interview the Appellant.

This clearly was not

something which was designed to serve any legitimate judicial
function as an aid in arriving at an appropriate sentence for the
Appellant.

Instead, this was an inappropriate means of attempting

to coerce Appellant into giving up his rights against selfincrimination.
Had these federal agents offered immunity in a forthright and
plain manner, then Appellant could perhaps have been termed
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uncooperative for his refusal to participate in an interview with
them.

However, as immunity was never offered, the danger of

subsequent federal prosecution, based upon information obtained
from that very interview, was never displaced; and Appellant was
well within his right to remain silent and not make potentially
incriminating statements to these federal investigators. See.
United States v. Manduiano. 425 U.S. 564, 575, (1976); Ullmann v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 (1956).
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court abused its discretion when it sentenced Clark
to a second, and then a third consecutive sentence because Clark
was not willing to cooperate with law enforcement, despite the
fact that absolutely no grant of immunity was ever offered.
Therefore, this Court should find that the Trial Court did, in
fact, abuse its discretion, and correct the illegal and
unconstitutional sentence imposed by the Trial Court in this case.
The absolute most that the Trial Court could justify under the
circumstances was a single consecutive term for the crimes Clark
had been convicted of.
REQUEST FOR ORAL

ARGUMENT

Appellant requests oral argument in this case as it may
assist this Court in the disposition of the case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $H

dav.of Dec,

Robert L. Booker
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE

OF

DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of the Appellant was mailed to Kenneth Bronston,
Assistant Attorney General, Jan C. Graham, Attorney General's
Office, Criminal Appeals Division, 236 State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this
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^ " V day of December, 1995.

